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Abstract. Decentralization is believed to constitute the optimal institutional 
arrangement for public good provision. In contrast to centralization, it is thought to 
offer a better match between provision and individual preferences. We test this 
hypothesis by analyzing the Spanish decentralization process undergone since 1980s 
exploiting survey data. A higher degree of satisfaction is expressed when education and 
health provision is assigned to the intermediate tier of government rather than to central 
government. This, however, is not recorded for largest regions or for the case of the 
justice administration, where the responsibility assigned to (some) regions is of a 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Is fiscal decentralization welfare enhancing? According to the mainstream of the 
literature on fiscal federalism, the answer is yes. However, surprisingly very few studies 
have empirically tested this assumption1. The claim is that fiscal decentralization brings 
about gains in the allocative efficiency of public service provision (Tiebout, 1956; 
Oates, 1972)2. Thus, according to Oates’ decentralization theorem, in the absence of 
economies of scale, sub-central government provision will be at least as efficient as that 
of central government, provided the latter is restricted to providing a uniform 
composition of public expenditure throughout the territory and differences in demand 
exist between jurisdictions. Similarly, the “voting-with-the-feet” argument developed 
by Tiebout rests on an analogy between private market provision and public provision, 
whereby physical mobility – for an infinite supply of local jurisdictions – should lead to 
citizens taking up residence in that jurisdiction where the composition of public 
expenditure perfectly matches their individual preferences. 
 
Yet, these theories might be considered as being somewhat restrictive. For example, the 
traditional literature assumes a decision-making process based on a benevolent policy-
maker abstracting from political economy considerations; and, moreover, in some 
contexts, physical mobility is far from cost-free. In attempting to overcome these 
restrictions, the second-generation theory of fiscal federalism (Oates, 2005) frames the 
analysis within the context of political economy. In this case, even if there were no 
physical mobility, yardstick competition (Besley and Case, 1995), or simply a better 
representation of the decisive voter under representative democracy (Seabright, 1996; 
Besley and Coate, 2003), would mean that the allocation of public expenditure was 
superior to that under centralized decision-making3. All in all, fiscal decentralization 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Diaz-Serrano and Rodriguez-Pose (2012, 2015) rightly argue that many studies test for the 
impact of decentralization on poverty reduction, economic growth, inter-personal inequality, 
formation of social capital, and so on, but that they tend to miss the point, which is determining 
whether decentralization leads to a better public delivery of services and, as a consequence, to 
an enhanced level of social welfare. 
 
2 See Eppel and Nechyba (2004), section 4, for a complete review of this question. 
 
3 Interestingly, the process of decentralization could simultaneously imply an efficiency gain in 
those regions where provision is still centralized. This could be due to a process of vertical 
yardstick competition (Breton and Fraschini, 2003). We thank the Editor for pointing out this 
possibility. 
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should improve political accountability and, with it, social welfare4. 
 
The empirical literature, which is reviewed in detail in the next section, has adopted a 
range of different approaches when testing for the presence of welfare gains under 
decentralization and, in almost all instances, the empirical evidence is favorable to 
decentralized institutional arrangements. Some papers have focused on whether the 
outcomes of certain public policies (or indeed general subjective well-being) improve 
when provision is decentralized (Hoxby, 2000; Treisman, 2002; Cantarero and Pascual, 
2008; Bjørnskov, Drehe and Fischer, 2008; Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés, 2011; Díaz-
Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012; Falch and Fischer, 2012; or Caldeira, Foucault, 
Rota-Graziosi, 2012 and 2015); others on whether decentralized public policies are 
more responsive to expenditure needs (Faguet, 2004; Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé, 
2005; Borge, Brueckner and Rattsø, 2014); others have examined whether politicians 
have better knowledge about voter preferences in small jurisdictions (Dahlberg, Mörk 
and Ågren, 2005); while a final strand of the empirical literature has turned its attention 
to the question of whether public expenditure composition varies as a consequence of 
decentralization (González-Alegre, 2010; Arze del Granado, Martínez-Vazquez and 
McNab, 2012; and again, Borge, Brueckner and Rattsø, 2014). The approach followed 
by most of these papers is general enough to accommodate welfare gains due to greater 
levels of allocative efficiency and of productive efficiency. In contrast, Barankay and 
Lockwood (2007) and Balaguer-Coll, Prior and Tortosa-Ausina (2010) explicitly focus 
on productive efficiency. In this paper, we seek to estimate the welfare gains stemming 
from allocative efficiency. 
 
Litvak, Ahmad and Bird (1998, p. vii) argue that ‘decentralization is neither good nor 
bad for efficiency, equity or macroeconomic stability; but rather […] its effects depend 
on institution-specific design’. In line with this reasoning, we test whether there are 
gains in efficiency as a consequence of decentralization, but also we seek to determine 
whether the very nature of decentralization is relevant at all. Specifically, we test 
whether a higher level of tax autonomy enhances efficiency due to greater freedom in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ultimately, as Wildasin (1995 p.2) points out, this means that “exit” (first-generation theories), 
“voice” (second-generation theories) or both are more easily attained under decentralization. 
See also the interesting reflections combining both approaches by Eichenberger (1994).  
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the design of public policies and greater political accountability5. 
 
We focus our study on the case of Spain and draw on available survey data. The 
decentralization process in Spain has been sufficiently rich over time and across its 
regions or state-level governments (the so-called “Comunidades Autónomas” (ACs)) to 
present enough variation to test our hypotheses. With some gaps6, our survey data cover 
the period 1994-2011, during which time we find cases of centralized and decentralized 
provision for the same service for a given year. The survey contains information from 
approximately 2,500 respondents per year, giving a total, after filtering, of a pool of 
around 20,000 observations. The great advantage of this sample is that, in contrast with 
cross-country data, we do not need to match individual data with macro data to account 
for (the degree of) decentralization. This means, on the one hand, that our dependent 
variable is based on individual responses regarding the degree of satisfaction with the 
public service provision of health, education and justice; while, on the other, we know 
the AC in which the respondent resides and whether the corresponding service is 
decentralized. The key point, here, is that for purposes of identification not all ACs 
assumed responsibility for the corresponding expenditure at the same time. 
 
We obtain robust empirical evidence that points to the superiority of sub-central public 
service provision. Citizens show a greater level of satisfaction when the AC in which 
they reside is responsible for the provision of education and health, being greatest the 
positive impact of decentralization on health. However, in the case of justice, 
decentralization does not make a difference. In this latter case, note those ACs in charge 
of this service are mere administrators, so welfare gains – if any –would be due to 
productivity gains, and not to allocative efficiency gains. The estimated welfare gains in 
the first two services, though, depend on the population size of the region. For regions 
approximately with more than 1.8 inhabitants for education and with more than 2.8 
million inhabitants for health, the gains are very imprecisely estimated such that no 
clear-cut conclusion – within our population sample – can be inferred. The estimated 
impact of the nature of decentralization, in particular, when this includes tax revenue 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See, for example, Brueckner (2009) or Peralta (2011). 
 
6 We do not have any information on satisfaction about public good provision for the period 
2001-04, as the question was not included in the survey. 
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decentralization, on satisfaction is null.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the main 
theoretical and empirical literature on the welfare gains of fiscal decentralization. In 
Section 3, we describe the process of decentralization in Spain, since its dynamics over 
time and across its regions is very rich. In Section 4, we present our database and 
discuss our identification strategy. Results are presented in Section 5 and conclusions 
drawn in Section 6. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Decentralization might not be without its costs (Prud’homme, 1995) or, at least, a 
careful design of the political process should be implemented to guarantee its supposed 
welfare gains (see, for example, Weingast, 1995 & 2009, for a description of the 
necessary conditions to ensure maximum welfare gains). Wasteful duplication of 
operating costs, or greater effectiveness of interest groups at the local level (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 2000; Bordignon, Colombo and Galmarini, 2008) are some of the 
potential costs of decentralization (see Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005, for a recent 
detailed review of these costs). Despite this, in our empirical analysis, we focus on the 
supposed gains of decentralization associated with a better matching between public 
service delivery and individual preferences, i.e., allocative efficiency. 
 
The superiority of sub-central governments in assessing individual demands for local 
public services (first-generation theories of fiscal federalism) and their greater 
incentives to infer these demands in the process of political competition (second-
generation theories) are usually taken for granted. All in all, the outcome should be a 
better match between the demands of the representative citizen and public service 
provision in each region. This is the focus of our empirical paper. Below we review 
some of the papers mentioned in the Introduction, all of which (with the exception of 
Barankay and Lockwood, 2007) employ empirical methods to test for the presence of 
welfare gains attributable to allocative efficiency. 
 
Taking advantage of a 1994 decentralization reform in Bolivia, Faguet (2004) tested, 
first, whether the composition of public investment changed with respect to the pre-
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1994 situation and, second, and more importantly, whether the new pattern was 
responsive to local needs. For the 1987-1996 period he found empirical evidence of a 
change in the investment pattern in education, water and sanitation, agriculture, 
transport, urban development and communication, industry and tourism and water 
management; he found no significant differences in health expenditure. In the case of 
education, for example, local investment tended to be higher in areas with higher rates 
of illiteracy, while investment in water and sanitation was higher in areas where people 
had no sewerage. Hence, decentralization resulted in a new pattern of public service 
provision, reflecting local expenditure needs and, thus, providing unequivocal indirect 
evidence of welfare gains due to increased allocative efficiency. 
 
Borge, Brueckner and Rattsø’s (2014) analysis is very similar to Faguet’s (2004), since 
they tested whether decentralization leads to heterogeneity in the design of public 
policies, and again whether this reflects differences in local demands. However, rather 
than comparing centralization vs. decentralization, they compared the former with 
partial decentralization. Specifically, they took advantage of a 1986 reform in Norway, 
where local governments were given greater discretion to assign their funds to different 
public policies, that is, they still depended on grants (partial decentralization), but they 
were not constrained to spend according to the guidelines laid down by central 
government (centralization). Their empirical analysis covered the period 1980 to 1991, 
and focused on the following public services: childcare, primary and secondary 
education, and parks and cultural services. They found greater dispersion in the levels of 
local public provision between 1986-91 (partial decentralization) than between 1980-85 
(centralization), a result in keeping with greater heterogeneity in local public demands. 
 
Dahlberg, Mörk and Ågren (2005) used data from a 1996 survey conducted in 36 
Swedish municipalities. In each municipality 60 individuals were randomly 
interviewed, with a response rate of between 77 and 97 per cent. Individuals/voters were 
asked about their preferences for locally provided services, in particular whether they 
were satisfied with current public expenditure or whether they would prefer higher or 
lower levels, while politicians were asked about their belief about their voters’ 
preferences. The objective of their study was to determine whether politicians in small 
municipalities are relatively more aware of their constituents’ preferences. In relatively 
small jurisdictions (under 4,200 inhabitants), politicians were clearly more aware of 
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their voters’ preferences, pointing to welfare gains from fiscal decentralization. In 
municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants, significant discrepancies were found 
between voters’ preferences and what politicians actually think their voters want. 
Hence, according to this study, the benefits of decentralization stemming from 
allocative efficiency are dependent on the size of the jurisdiction. 
 
Probably, the closest empirical paper to ours is Díaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose 
(2015). They estimate to what extent citizens are satisfied with public provision of 
Education and Health across 31 European countries using the 2002, 2004, 2006 and 
2008 waves of the European Social Survey (ESS). They relate this measure of 
satisfaction with a measure of decentralization distinguishing between fiscal and 
political decentralization. On the one hand, the former accounts for the importance of 
subcentral revenue and expenditure over total public expenditure. On the other hand, the 
latter makes a difference between self-rule (the authority is directly exercised by 
subcentral authorities) and shared-rule countries (subcentral authorities capacity to 
influence national politics). Fiscal decentralization has an unambiguously effect on 
satisfaction with respect to both public services, while the results regarding political 
decentralization are not so clear-cut.  
 
In contrast with the previous analyses, Barankay and Lockwood (2007) focused their 
study on productive efficiency using Swiss data. They estimated a production function 
for education for the period 1982-2000, where the output variable was the percentage of 
19-year-olds obtaining the maturité certificate allowing them to go on to university. 
Controlling for various inputs, including class size and the percentage of non-native 
speakers, they found that decentralization (measured as the percentage expenditure of 
the counties in each canton) increased the output achievement. Specifically, a 10 per 
cent increase in decentralization raised the share of 19-year-olds obtaining the maturité 
by 3.5%. Therefore, according to this analysis, decentralization also adds welfare gains 
due to productive efficiency. 
 
Again in contrast with the previous analyses, Treisman (2002) employed a cross-
country database (of up to 166 countries) and found no evidence in support of fiscal 
decentralization, given its negative impact on several measures of quality of 
government. The study measured decentralization in a variety of ways: for example, to 
	  	   8 
account for local governments’ supposedly superior knowledge of individual 
preferences, Treisman constructed a dummy variable equal to one if the country’s 
constitution assigned at least one policy area exclusively to sub-national governments; 
to account for local electoral accountability he constructed a variable to account for the 
proportion of sub-national tiers of government with elected executives. Quality of 
government was measured via perceived corruption, as well as by means of various 
outputs or outcomes of government provision. For example, in the case of public health, 
he used the percentage of infants under 12 months that had been inoculated for 
diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis; for (basic) education, the rate of youth illiteracy; and 
for transportation infrastructure, the number of kilometers of paved road per resident. 
 
Thus, all the above studies – with the exception of Treisman (2002) – find a positive 
effect of decentralization. In contrast to some of those analyses, the study reported here 
focuses on specific areas of expenditure, namely, education, health and justice, and 
examines individual levels of satisfaction for each. Our measure of decentralization 
takes advantage of Spain’s dynamic process of devolution (see following section). 
Thus, decentralization, as in Faguet (2002), is a dummy equal to one if the 
corresponding expenditure competence has been decentralized. Our analysis also seeks 
to test for the impact of decentralization according to the nature of that process, given 
that the decentralization of expenditure and revenue responsibilities has not followed 
the same path over time. The ACs also vary considerably in terms of population size, so 
we are able to determine whether welfare gains – if any – are dependent on population. 
All in all, the peculiarities of the Spanish case7 should enrich previous analyses. 
 
 
III. THE PROCESS OF DECENTRALIZATION IN SPAIN 
 
Spain constitutes an interesting case study, having experienced an intense process of 
decentralization following the restoration of democracy in the late seventies. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 An interesting study in this regard is Goodspeed (1994). This paper investigates the equity and 
efficiency consequences of the sub-central financial system in Spain in the late 1980s 
(characterized by a relatively low degree of tax autonomy) relative to a system based on 
decentralized revenue sources. Employing a theoretical model (unlike the empirical analyses 
reported in the studies reviewed above), Goodspeed finds efficiency losses of between 9 and 
more than 20% of revenue, depending on assumptions regarding the price and income 
elasticities of demand for public services. 
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adoption of the Spanish Constitution in 1978 heralded the beginning of democracy, and 
the division of the State territory into ACs and municipalities. There are thus three 
levels of government: central, regional and local. The regional level, which did not exist 
before 1978 and comprises seventeen ACs, was created in recognition of the right to 
autonomy of the regions and nationalities in Spain8.  
 
The ACs were gradually established between 1979 and 1983, and the central 
government began to transfer responsibilities and services to them. The origin of 
expenditure decentralization in Spain can be described as a political process in response 
to the wishes of having more self-government by the Basque Country and Catalonia, 
and to a lesser extent, by Galicia. Given this, in order to avoid a territorial conflict, 
decentralization spilt over the rest of regions but following a non-uniform evolution, as 
we will discuss below.	   Figure 1 shows the evolution in the relative importance of the 
Spanish public sector at different layers of government for the period 1970-2011. As 
can be seen, decentralization started in 1980 and has intensified thereafter: central 
government spending in 1980 accounted for 89.5% of the whole, while in 2011 it had 
fallen to 53.5%. Regional government spending increased from 0% to 34.3%, but the 
weight of local government spending did not increase. Health and education 
expenditure are the main items of regional expenditure; accounting for approximately 
33% and 24% of total non-financial regional spending, respectively. While there has 
been a considerable degree of decentralization in public spending, there has been 
significantly less on the tax revenue side, although since the late 1990s there has been 
an increase in tax autonomy (see Durán and Esteller-Moré, 2005).  
 
[FIGURE 1] 	  
The Spanish Constitution (SC), the Statutes of Autonomy of each AC and the Local 
Government Act regulate the distribution of power by levels of government. The ACs 
assumed expenditure competences in an asymmetric fashion. Thus, depending on the 
specific route taken to autonomy, a distinction needs to be drawn between three types of 
AC: those created under article 143 of the SC, those created under article 151 of the SC, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See, for example, Solé-Vilanova (1989). 
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and the so-called “foral” communities9. The route taken by the former grants access 
only to common responsibilities, and temporarily excludes two basic functions, i.e. 
health and education, while the other two types of AC assumed these responsibilities 
from the outset. However, responsibilities in education were gradually transferred to the 
remaining ACs under article 143 between 1995 and 1999, while responsibilities for 
health provision were transferred to all those ACs in 2002. In the case of the other two 
groups (the so-called “common regime”), foral ACs have (almost) complete tax 




Table 2 shows the considerable variation in the timing of decentralization. For example, 
in the case of education, the Basque Country and Catalonia were the first ACs to 
assume this responsibility in 1981, while it took almost 20 years for a large group of 
ACs (Asturias, Castile-León, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, Community of Madrid 
and Region of Murcia) to take on this responsibility10. Catalonia was also the first AC to 
assume responsibility for the provision of health11. The decentralization of justice has 
followed a quite different path. In this case, decentralization refers to the 
“administration of the (Administration) of Justice”; that is, for example, there is only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “Foral” refers to Navarre and to the Basque Country (in particular, within the Basque Country, 
to the so-called “Diputaciones Forales”, Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya), whose “historical 
rights” were explicitly recognized in the 1978 SC. 
 
10 With the restoration of democracy, Education was a political priority both for Catalonia and 
for the Basque Country to protect their own language and recover the ideals behind the short 
period of time of the II Republic (1931-36). That is why, they were the first ACs in assuming 
this responsibility. Soon after that, Galicia (1983) and Valencia (1984), which also have 
linguistic singularities to preserve, did the same, while Andalucía did it in 1983. The rest of 
ACs assumed this responsibility between 1999 and 2000, when the central government, in 
accordance with the article 143 of the Constitution, decided to transfer it to all the rest of ACs 
without carrying out, though, any previous economic analysis about the convenience of this 
expenditure decentralization. 
 
11 Having been Catalonia, as in Education, the first AC to assume the responsibility for the 
provision of Health, the rest of ACs of the article 151 were transferred this responsibility 
throughout the eighties and even the nineties. The revision of the financing model of the ACs in 
2001, which entered into force in 2002, supposed the generalization of the decentralization of 
this responsibility. In this regard, after a hard process of negotiation, the rest of ACs assumed it. 
In fact, the central government conditioned the implementation of the new financing system to 
the acceptance by these ACs of this expenditure responsibility. As in Education, the decision 
was not taken on the basis of an economic analysis.  
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one General Council of the Judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial), which 
oversees all Spanish judges. Moreover, entrance to the judiciary is via state 
examination. Hence, all the rules and guidelines governing the Administration of justice 
are fully centralized, although administrative matters relating to justice might be 
decentralized. Therefore, while we do not expect to detect any differences between the 
ACs in terms of the provision of justice, we might see differences in the production of 
the service. Indeed, it is unlikely that this latter dimension will have some impact on 
assessments of the service, as Esteller-Moré (2013) reports in another context. In all 
circumstances, it should provide indirect evidence of the potential importance of 
productive efficiency gains due to decentralization. 
 
 [TABLE 2] 
 
The growth of the regional system and subsequent process of devolution have given rise 
to significant differences between regions in terms of the services transferred. These 
differences can be detected in their respective results, in the resources allocated to the 
services in each region, and in the organization of production. Medical outcomes differ 
markedly between the ACs12, for example, the infant mortality rate (number of deaths of 
infants under one year old per 1,000 live births) ranges from 1.78 in Navarre to 4.80 in 
Murcia. Other differences are found in the number of medical staff (doctors, specialists 
and nurses) per inhabitant, in the level of capital endowment (hospital beds, day hospital 
posts and operating rooms) per inhabitant, as well as in the provision of technology 
(nuclear magnetic resonance apparatus, radiation therapy, mammography, etc.). Thus, 
decentralization has led to a differentiated health service provision between Spain’s 
regions. The same is true of education. Again, not only are there differences in 
academic results13, but there are also differences in inputs, including total education 
spending, the size of classes, and the number of pupils per teacher14. Some ACs provide 
free textbooks (Castile-La Mancha and Extremadura, among others) and specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See the Annual Reports of the National Health System, produced by the Observatory of the 
National Health System, Ministry of Health.  
 




14 See Mora, Escardíbul and Espasa (2010). 
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programs to support children’s education and grants15. 
 
 




As we have seen in the previous section, over the last thirty years Spain has undergone a 
process of expenditure decentralization, which has not however been homogeneous 
across its ACs. Here, we specifically seek to exploit this time and cross-sectional 
variation to determine whether satisfaction with respect to public expenditure allocation 
has increased as a consequence of decentralization. 
 
Our dependent variable is based on an annual survey carried out by a public research 
center, the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). This is a repeated cross-
section survey, based on a nationally representative sample of individuals, which 
focuses on subjective perceptions of the tax system and publicly provided goods and 
services in Spain. We use the 1994-2011 waves. Specifically, our dependent variable 
ranges from 1 (not at all satisfied with public provision) to 4 (the highest level of 
satisfaction)16. Given the nature of the question, respondents’ satisfaction might be due 
to a combination of allocative efficiency and productive efficiency, which we will try to 
disentangle. Moreover, given that we use a subjective measure of efficiency, there 
might be some individual biases. For example, if individuals are not users of a particular 
service, their responses might be arbitrary, or if they hold strong feelings per se about 
the decentralization process (e.g., given their nationalistic sentiments), they might tend 
to provide a systematically positive assessment of decentralized services. In the 
empirical analysis, we tackle these potential sources of bias. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See Calero and Escardíbul (2005). 
 
16 The original survey question reads as follows in Spanish: “¿Diría Ud. que los siguientes 
servicios públicos funcionan muy satisfactoriamente, bastante, poco o nada 
satisfactoriamente”?, that is: “Would you say the functioning of the following public services is 
very, quite, a little or not at all satisfactory?” The list of public services may change from year 
to year, although education, health, and justice are always on the list. Unfortunately, though, as 
mentioned, this question was not included for the 2001-2004 waves. 
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In Table 3, we show the main descriptive statistics. For our period of analysis, the total 
number of observations is 32,287. However, the final number for each public service is 
smaller, as responses where the respondent refuses to answer or does not know how to 
respond were disregarded.  The mean value of our endogenous variable – level of 
satisfaction – is 2.5 and 2.4 for education and health, respectively, while satisfaction for 
the provision of justice is lower at just below 2. In Figure 2, we show how levels of 
satisfaction vary according to whether provision is decentralized or centralized. As can 
be seen, justice receives the worst assessment, with around 40% of respondents 
claiming not to be at all satisfied. Such extreme assessments are not found for the other 
two services. Yet, the graphical comparison of centralization vs. decentralization does 
not allow us to draw any clear-cut conclusions. In the case of education and health, the 
distribution at the tails hardly changes, but as we know from Table 3, under 
decentralization average satisfaction is lower and higher for these services, respectively. 
A multivariate analysis should help us in ascertaining whether decentralization has had 






2. Empirical Framework 
 
For a given public service, we propose estimating a difference-in-difference model: 
 
Sijt = xijt' β1 + acjt' β2 +β3Djt + eijt  (1) 
 
All the variables are expressed in levels, where 𝑆!"#, satisfaction with public provision – 
our endogenous variable –, is a qualitative variable for individual i in AC j at time t, 
which ranges from 1 to 4 (see section 4.1), 𝑥!"#! is a vector of individual characteristics 
(sex, age, civil status, years of education, and a vector of employment characteristics17 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The years of education and the vector of employment characteristics (including whether the 
respondent is self-employed or an employee, unemployed or retired) should proxy the 
respondent’s level of income, which is not available from the survey. 
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including occupation 18 , industry of employment 19  and labor status) and 𝛽! is the 
corresponding vector of coefficients to be estimated, 𝑎𝑐!" is a vector of characteristics of 
AC j (in which the respondent resides) at time t (population, GDP pc., percentage of 
immigrants, current public expenditure pc, and share of young people and old people to 
account for expenditure needs of education and health, respectively), 𝛽!  is the 
corresponding vector of coefficients to be estimated, 𝐷!"is a binary indicator which 
equals 1 if the responsibility for providing the corresponding service is decentralized, 𝛽!- our key estimate - is the impact of decentralization on individual satisfaction with 
public provision, and 𝑒!"#is an error term with standard properties. We expect 𝛽! ≥ 020. 
 
In the case of the dependent variable, we assume interpersonal comparability of 
satisfaction, i.e., individuals share a common understanding of what satisfaction means. 
The accumulated empirical evidence suggests that this is a sensible assumption, which 
is sustained by the ability, for example, of individuals to predict the satisfaction felt by 
other individuals from photographic evidence, and by the clear relationship between 
reported satisfaction and facial expression, such as smiling (for a discussion, see Clark, 
Frijters and Shields, 2008). Interpersonal comparability can be assumed at the ordinal or 
cardinal level. In the first case, utility is assumed to be ordinal so that, for instance, 
individuals reporting a 4 are more satisfied than those reporting a 2, but not necessarily 
twice as much. If we assume interpersonal comparability at the cardinal level the 
distances between the answers provide information, which means that someone 
reporting a 4 is twice as satisfied as someone reporting a 2. In this paper we adopt a 
cautious approach and assume cardinality. That is why, our baseline regressions are 
estimated by OLS21.  
 
The estimate 𝛽!could hide the heterogeneous impact of decentralization dependent on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Based on the 1979 National Classification of Occupations. 
 
19 Based on the two-digit National Classification of Economic Activities. 
 
20 According to fn. 3, this estimate could be a lower bound as long as a process of vertical 
yardstick competition raised the performance incentives of the central government.  	  
21 We have also run checks to determine whether imposing cardinality or ordinality changes the 
nature of the results (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). In particular, we have estimated 
ordinary ordered logit model, and the qualitative results obtained via OLS still hold. These 
estimations are available upon request.  
	  	   15 
population size. In terms of size, the ACs are quite heterogeneous; for example, the 
largest is Andalusia with a little more than 8 million inhabitants and the smallest is La 
Rioja, with a little more than 300,000 inhabitants. Hence, in Andalusia there are 25 
inhabitants for every inhabitant of La Rioja. We expect the matching between individual 
preferences and public expenditure to be more accurate in the smallest ACs (see, for 
example, Dahlberg, Mörk and Ågren, 2005). For this reason, we amend the basic model 
as follows to account for differences in size: 
 
Sijt = xijt' ψ1 + acjt' ψ2 +ψ3Djt +ψ4Djt ×Popjt +ψ5Popjt + e 'ijt  (2) 
 
In this specification, the 𝜓!   pick up the corresponding estimates. We seek to ascertain 
the extent to which the impact of decentralization depends on population size. The 
estimate 𝜓! informs us about the marginal ability of decentralized governments to deal 
with large populations relative to the ability of the central government, which is picked 
up by 𝜓! . Hence, for example, if 𝜓! > 0 and 𝜓! < 0, this would imply that the 
optimality of decentralized provision only holds up to a certain population threshold, 
while if 𝜓! = 0, this would imply that the gains or losses from decentralization are not 
size dependent. We will also allow for a more flexible specification of (2); in particular, 
we will test whether the impact of population interacted with decentralization is non-
linear. 
 
The inclusion of control variables is critical for purposes of identification and for the 
interpretation of our estimates. First, in the above model, we control for fixed time 
effects. On the one hand, given the process of decentralization has evolved over time, it 
may coincide with global innovations in the process of public provision. On the other 
hand, due to electoral competition, the central government may have greater incentives 
to perform efficiently, which could cause a downward bias in the estimate of 
decentralization. In order to isolate the impact of decentralization from these potential 
biases, we include time effects in the above specification. Second, the inclusion of fixed 
effects (by AC) should control for structural differences in the needs or in the 
preferences that might bias our estimates22. Third, we aim to estimate gains in allocative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Hence, the empirical strategy described so far controls both for time-invariant and time-
varying unobservable characteristics, and also for important time-varying observable 
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efficiency. In contrast with productive efficiency gains, this should imply a different 
composition of public expenditure, while keeping total public expenditure constant. For 
this reason we control for current public expenditure (Falch and Fischer, 2012), 
including it in the vector 𝑎𝑐!". This might still be an imperfect control. However, our 
empirical analysis of satisfaction with (the administration of) justice administration – 
where, if any, we should only obtain productive efficiency gains – should provide 
additional evidence about the nature of the potential gains of decentralization. 
 
The basic specification (1) (or the amended model (2)) does not fully exploit all the 
institutional details of the Spanish case. The variable 𝐷!"in (1) accounts for all those 
situations in which the service has been decentralized to an AC independently of how 
the provision is funded. As discussed in previous sections, though, we can test whether 
the level of tax autonomy has an impact on the level of decentralized public good 
provision23. For this reason we add to the basic specification (1) (and similarly to (2)) a 
dummy that picks up the higher level of tax decentralization since 1997. Specifically, 
we have the following: 
 
Sijt = xijt' φ1 + acjt' φ2 +φ3Djt +φ4 (Djt ×TDt )+ eijt  (3) 
 
According to the above specification, the base impact of provision decentralization is 
picked up by 𝜙!. The variable 𝑇𝐷! is a qualitative variable, which only shows time 
variation, as tax decentralization was introduced simultaneously across all ACs. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
heterogeneity such that we can reasonably be confident to produce causal estimates of 
decentralization. Nevertheless, simultaneity could still be an issue. As we argued in section 3, 
though, decentralization has not been a consequence of the (negative) assessment of public 
service provision, but was originally caused by the demand of self-government of some ACs 
(basically, Catalonia and the Basque Country), which in the end – by the mere pass of time and 
in order to avoid territorial tensions – made the rest of ACs also assumed those expenditure 
responsibilities. 
 
23 An interesting hypothesis to test based on the Spanish institutional context concerns the 
peculiarities of the “foral” communities described in section 3. Unfortunately, though, we 
cannot identify the impact of the “foral” communities having greater tax autonomy than the rest 
of the ACs, as we do not have a counterfactual, that is, introducing a dummy variable for them 
would confound with the AC fixed effect. 
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ACs have enjoyed substantial tax powers since 1997 (Durán and Esteller-Moré, 2005)24. 
We expect ϕ4≥0. 
 
Finally, note that the nature of the endogenous variable, which is based on a survey 
question, might cause a problem of representativeness. Indeed, the question might give 
rise to a potential misperception on the part of the respondent of the real public 
expenditure policy and a potential error in estimating the respondent’s desired demand 
for public expenditure. On the one hand, errors regarding the perception of the real 
composition of public expenditure are presumably less likely among individuals that are 
better informed about the actions of the government. On the other hand, some 
individuals might tend to positively evaluate decentralized public policies regardless of 
the actual situation because of their nationalistic sentiments. We control for these 
variables (degree of information and self-identification as nationalistic) in levels and 





1. Basic Results 
 
All our estimates refer to marginal effects obtained by OLS estimations. The empirical 
results for education are shown in Table 4a. In Model 1, we present the basic model 
where we control for all individual characteristics and regional variables that might 
have an impact on the regional preferences and needs of public service provision, 
including time and regional fixed effects. To save space not all the estimates of 
individual characteristics are shown in the table, but they are available upon request. We 
discuss the estimated marginal effects – which account for the corresponding 
interactions –, but we also show in all tables the corresponding OLS estimates for these 
interaction terms. The absolute value of the estimated marginal effect of 
Decentralization on satisfaction with public provision of education is not statistically 
significant. However, in that model, we do not control for the level of total current 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In spite of the fact that tax decentralization occurred in 1997, it was not till 2001 when some 
ACs enacted important tax changes. We cannot identify, though, this particular impact as from 
2001 all ACs had assumed Education and Health. 
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expenditure pc, so the estimate might be a mix of productive (in)efficiency and 
allocative (in)efficiency. In an attempt at isolating this latter effect, in Model 2 we 
control for total current expenditure p.c. Then, the estimate of the marginal effect of 
Decentralization becomes slightly higher, but is still statistically insignificant25. In 
Model 3, we test whether the gains of decentralization depend on the population size of 
the region by means of interacting this variable with Decentralization. We have 
estimated marginal effects of Decentralization by population thresholds (not shown in 
the table) and the impact of decentralization is positive and statistically significant at 
90% confidence level for those ACs of up to 2 million inhabitants, approximately. In 
Model 4, results do not change for the average AC when we account for the process of 
tax decentralization occurred since 1997, nor in Model 5 when we combine Model 3 
and Model 4.  
 
In Model 6, in part due to the statistical significance of the variable Population in levels 
in the previous regressions and to the heterogeneous estimated impact of 
Decentralization across population thresholds, we allow for a more flexible impact of 
population on our endogenous variable by means of including the variable Population 
non-linearly (i.e., Population and Population^2), and also interacting Population and its 
squared with Decentralization26. This specification, which still controls for the potential 
impact of a greater level of tax autonomy since 1997, shows that decentralization has a 
positive impact (0.227) for the average AC in terms of population size, being 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. This marginal effect corresponds to 
a 32.6% of the standard deviation of the level of satisfaction with the public provision 
of education. In Table 4b, we show the marginal effect estimated for different 
population thresholds. From these estimates, we infer greater levels of satisfaction due 
to decentralization concentrate on the smallest ACs; in particular, the welfare gains of 
decentralization are not statistically significant for regions with more than 1.8 million 
inhabitants, approximately27. For the largest ACs, certainly we also find a positive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Note in absence of interactions, the marginal effect and the corresponding OLS estimate 
coincide.  	  
26 We thank the referee for suggesting to test for this possibility. 
 
27 This and the following population thresholds we estimate are not comparable with those – 
much lower – found by Dahlberg, Mörk and Ågren (2005) (see section 2), as their study is 
conducted with local governments. 
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impact, which is almost equal to the one obtained for the first considered threshold, but 
must be cautious about this given the estimates are not statistically significant within 
our population sample. The estimates are not statistically different between pre- and 
post-1997. The estimated impact of decentralization is relatively small, around a third of 
the standard deviation. At most, decentralization increases satisfaction by around 0.25 
points (for the smallest regions), being 4 the highest value of this variable and 2.5 its 
average for the period under analysis (see Table 3). In terms of comparison with the rest 
of covariates, the magnitude of decentralization is the second largest. In fact, the 
magnitude of the effect is almost the same as the one from population, which is the 
largest one. 
 
[TABLE 4a & 4b] 
 
The results for health provision are shown in Table 5a; its structure is identical to that of 
the previous table. The main difference in the empirical specifications for health is that 
– instead of the share of schooling population – we include the share of population over 
65 years as a proxy for demand of health. The impact of decentralization is positive and 
statistically significant at the 90% confidence level in Model 2, that is, independently of 
the size of the AC. However, from Model 6, with respect to the results obtained for 
education, we obtain for health both a larger impact of decentralization and a higher 
degree of heterogeneity across population thresholds. This is shown by means of Table 
5b. In particular, decentralization is welfare-enhancing for those ACs of up to 2.8 
millions inhabitants, approximately, there being an increasing trend till a maximum at 
the range of 1.8-2.8 millions inhabitants. However, nothing can be said above this 
threshold, again, for inefficiency of our estimates from this point of the distribution 
onwards. The impact of the greater level of tax autonomy since 1997 goes in the 
contrary direction – towards a lower level of satisfaction –, being the difference 
between the estimates pre- and post-1997 statistically significant at the 90% confidence 
level. At most (for the period pre-1997 and for medium-size regions), the impact of 
health decentralization on satisfaction is around 0.6 points, being the average of the 
period equal to 2.4 (see Table 3). That is, the favorable impact of decentralizing health 
provision is almost three times the positive impact of decentralizing education. In 
particular, this marginal effect accounts for 73.6% of the standard deviation of the level 
of satisfaction with public provision of health. Also, comparatively to the rest of 
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covariates, the effect from decentralization is the largest one. 
 
[TABLE 5a & 5b] 
 
In Table 6a, we present the whole set of results for justice; and in Table 6b by 
population thresholds. In this case, we do not have a proper variable to account for 
demand, although we presume GDP pc, Population or the time and regional fixed 
effects play this role. Expenditure decentralization is not welfare enhancing 
independently of whether tax revenue is also decentralized or of the level of regional 
population. This is not unexpected, since as we said in section 3 the nature of 
expenditure decentralization is merely administrative. Moreover, the average 
respondent to the survey might not be a (current or past) user of the service, and so 
might assess public provision based on a consideration of justice as a pure public good 
rather than as a private service. This might be why population does not have any impact 
on the private assessment of public service provision. Still those that are better informed 
express a more negative assessment of public provision. Finally, in contrast with the 
other two public services, where the estimate was not statistically significant, those 
individuals identified as nationalistic systematically express a negative view of the 
service. Again, this is further evidence that they are implicitly assessing a pure public 
service, which is provided all over Spain, and that they may well link it to the 
concentration of power in central government and so the situation does not change when 
the administration is decentralized. 
 
 [TABLE 6a & 6b] 
 
All in all, we find decentralization to be welfare enhancing in those cases where this not 
only implies that regional governments administer the service, but they also have a 
certain political power. However, the benefits of decentralization crucially depend on 
the population size of the region28, while we do not find empirical evidence in favor of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In order to have as a reference, in the period 1994-2011, La Rioja, Cantabria, Navarre, 
Balearic Islands, Extremadura, Asturias, Aragón and Murcia had less than 1.8 million 
inhabitants. Canary Islands, Castile-La Mancha, the Basque Country, Castile- León and Galicia 
had between 1.8-2.8 million inhabitants.  
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positive impact of tax revenue decentralization29. Note our results are in accordance 
with those obtained by Díaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose (2015) in favor of the 
efficiency gains due to the decentralization of education and health, in their case, using 
a cross-country sample of European countries. 
 
 
2. Robustness Checks 
 
In this section, we present robustness checks for all three areas of expenditure. The 
results for education, health and justice are shown in Table 7. Remember we display 
marginal effects. The structure of each set of estimations is the same, while the 
individual and regional controls in each case are the same as those used when obtaining 
our previous results.  
 
The responses obtained in the survey might be biased, given that some individuals may 
not be real users, while some users might per se tend to be less critical with the 
decentralized provision, for example, those who define themselves as nationalistic. For 
this reason, in the rest of the models presented in the tables, we not only include the 
variable Level of information and Nationalistic in levels, but we also interact them with 
Decentralization. From the results, we infer that accounting for these potential biases 
does not make our previous average marginal effects (not distinguishing between pre 
and post-1997) vary. 
 





The trend recorded the world over in favor of expenditure decentralization is coherent 
with the welfare gains identified by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972) attributable to 
allocative efficiency. In particular, this literature concludes that – in the absence of 
economies of scale (a production-side argument) and inter-jurisdictional externalities – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Once could certainly argue that this is due to an imperfect or incomplete tax revenue 
decentralization process (see, for example, Lago-Peñas and Martínez-Vázquez, 2010). 
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decentralized provision is at least as efficient as centralized provision. Most of the 
empirical literature reviewed in section 2 supports this argument. In this paper, we have 
tested this claim using survey data, and have sought to infer whether the welfare gains 
attributable to expenditure decentralization – if any – are present for all regions 
independently of their size and whether there is any further gain associated with tax 
revenue decentralization. 
 
We have tested the claim for three key services: education, health and justice. In the 
Spanish case, though, political decentralization only really holds for the first two 
services. Logically, therefore, we only obtain welfare gains for education and health, as 
we were only able to estimate allocative efficiency gains with respect to these two 
services. However, we need to be cautious, since the specific gains attributable to 
decentralization are not statistically significant for all regions; in particular, results are 
not conclusive for regions with more than 1.8 million inhabitants (accounting for 9 out 
of 17 regions), or for those with more than 2.8 million in the case of health (accounting 
for 4 out of 17 regions). This basic result is independent of the process of tax revenue 
decentralization initiated in 1997 (see also fn. 29). Given these results, it seems that the 
advantages of expenditure decentralization with respect to centralization should not be 
taken for granted. Empirical studies of other public services should shed further light on 
this important issue, especially focused on large jurisdictions where the benefits from 
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Figure 1. Evolution of the Spanish Decentralization Process (1970-2011) 
	  
	  
Sources: 1980-83: Bosch, N., J. Suárez-Pandiello, M. Espasa (1996): Local public finance in Europe: The case of 
Spain, European Commission. 1984-98: DG de Coordinación con las Haciendas Territoriales: La descentralización 
del gasto público en España. 1999-2001: Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas: Informe Económico-Financiero de 
las Administraciones Territoriales. 2002-2011: IGAE: Avance de la Actuación Presupuestaria de las 
Administraciones Públicas. 
 
 
 
